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Abstract 
Interaction analysis is not a prerogative of any discipline in social sciences. It has its 
own history within each disciplinary field and is related to specific research objects. From the 
standpoint of psychology, this article first draws upon a distinction between factorial and 
dialogical conceptions of interaction. It then briefly presents the basis of a dialogical approach 
in psychology and focuses upon four of basic assumptions. Each of them is examined on a 
theoretical and on a methodological level with a leading question: to what extent is it possible 
to develop analytical tools that are fully coherent with dialogical assumptions? The 
conclusion stresses the difficulty of developing methodological tools that are fully consistent 
with dialogical assumptions and argues that there is an unavoidable tension between 
accounting for the complexity of an interaction and using methodological tools which 
necessarily “monologise” this complexity. 
 
 
Keywords: dialogism, interaction, methodology, analysis of verbal interaction, 
interaction analysis 
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The Notion of Interaction in Psychology: A Matter of Misunderstanding 
The study of interaction is an integral part of the history of psychology. Work carried 
out by pioneers such as Jean Piaget, Lev Vygotsky, Kurt Lewin and George Herbert Mead 
can be seen as a response to dominant strands in psychology, namely associationism and its 
heir, behaviourism. For Piaget, the notion of interaction drew upon a constructivist stance and 
aimed at showing that individuals actively develop their intelligence through interaction with 
their physical and social environment. For Vygotsky too, the study of interaction was based 
upon a constructivist stance but Vygotsky’s research considered social relationships as an 
integral part of human development and viewed language as a cultural artefact for cognitive 
and social development. For Lewin (a follower of the Gestalt theory), the study of interaction 
stemmed from the assumption that the subject and the environment are interdependent and 
belong to the same field. For him, the subject’s action could not be understood independently 
of the field in which it occurred (Lewin, 1951a). As regards Mead (1967), he showed that 
intelligence (or mind) arises through communication or what he called a “conversation of 
symbolic gestures”. According to him, a gesture becomes a significant symbol only when the 
partners in interaction give the same meaning to this gesture or, in his words, when a gesture 
provokes the same response in the individual who did it as in the individual to whom it was 
addressed. In other terms, meaning is not a property of a gesture (or by extension of 
language), but a property of interaction.  
This schematic overview shows that the notion of interaction is controversial. First of 
all, depending upon the object of study, more or less attention may be paid to verbal 
interactions. In fact, in psychology, the study of interactions may include behaviour (think of 
Piaget’s research) and non-verbal interactions, for example, in the field of mother-infant 
interactions (Stern, 1995) or mother-father-infant interactions (Fivaz-Depeursinge & Corboz-
Warnery, 1999). Secondly, when they come to the study of verbal interactions (which will be 
 Interaction Analysis and Psychology 4 
my own focus), scholars rely upon different assumptions about the role of language and the 
relationship between the subject and the environment. Thirdly, they may pay more or less 
attention to the physical artefacts that mediate interpersonal interactions. This means that the 
notion of interaction is conceptualized in various ways. 
Starting from this observation, the aim of this article is to focus on a dialogical 
conception of interaction in order to answer the following question: to what extent is it 
possible to develop analytical tools that are fully coherent with dialogical assumptions? 
Drawing on a dialogical framework inspired by Bakhtin and more recent trends (e.g. 
Billig, 1996 ; François, 2005; Marková, 2003 ; Linell, 1998, 2005 ; Salazar Orvig, 1999 ; 
Wertsch, 1991) and following on from Marková’s work (Marková, 1997), I first present two 
contrasting conceptions of interaction: the first factorial, the second dialogical. I then briefly 
present some basic elements of a dialogical approach in psychology, examine four of its basic 
assumptions, and for each of them discuss their methodological implications. In conclusion, I 
stress the difficulty of developing methodological tools that are fully consistent with 
dialogical assumptions and argue that there is an unavoidable tension between accounting for 
the complexity of an interaction and using methodological tools which necessarily tend to 
“monologise” this complexity.  
Let me then start by showing that the various definitions of the notion of interaction 
can be grouped under two contrasting conceptions: the factorial and the dialogical.  
 
The Factorial Conception of Interaction 
According to a factorial conception (Marková, 1997), interaction is defined as a 
relationship between two (or more) entities that influence each other. Interaction is viewed as 
a chain of action-reaction or a “chain of stimulus-response” between the subject and the 
environment. In developmental psychology, a good illustration of this conception is offered 
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by post-Piagetian research into the role of context in cognitive development (e.g., Donaldson, 
1978; Light & Butterworth, 1992). In this field, typical empirical questions were: what is the 
influence of the context on the child’s level of conservation? Does a modification of the test 
instruction (or of the adult’s actions) influence the child’s cognitive level? Does the child’s 
answer reflect her real level of development or is it only an effect of the situation? All these 
questions were based upon similar epistemological assumptions: (a) the context is a set of 
external characteristics (or variables) that influence the subject, (b) under certain conditions, 
the role of the context can be neutralised (or “controlled”), for example if the researcher asks 
unambiguous (“clear”) questions, (c) language is the “royal path” to reaching the subject’s 
mental state. These three assumptions imply that under some circumstances the context in 
which a task is submitted to a child, and the characteristics of the task itself can be 
neutralised. Moreover, it implies that language can be unambiguous or transparent. 
Another illustration of a factorial conception of interaction is found in social 
psychology, in the study of group dynamics. In this field, Robert Bales is well known for 
developing a method (“Interaction Process Analysis”) aimed at describing interpersonal 
dynamics in small groups (Bales, 1950; for a discussion on Bales and Conversation Analysis, 
see Peräkylä, 2004). His scheme consisted of coding each action according to pre-defined 
categories (e.g., “asks for opinion” vs. “gives opinion”). In contradiction with Bales’ 
theoretical definition of a group, which was deeply inspired by Lewin, the group then 
appeared to be the result of individual actions. Later on, under the influence of speech act 
theory, coding schemes based upon similar principles (e.g., Stiles, 1992) were, and still are 
widely used (for a methodological discussion, see Linell & Marková, 1993). 
The factorial conception of interaction is undoubtedly the one most frequently used in 
psychology. As Schegloff claims, one probable reason for this is that cognitivist and other 
“psychologically-oriented” disciplines take “the single ‘minded’, embodied individual person 
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as the basic, enduring, integrally-organized reality to be studied” (Cmejrková & Prevignano, 
2003, p. 36). Another related reason is that psychology mainly stems from the natural 
sciences. Therefore its principal empirical tool is the experimental method, which requires the 
isolation of single variables, and can lead, thanks to statistical tools, to their combination in 
factors, clusters, etc. In other words, the factorial conception also derives from the tools that 
researchers use to collect and analyse their data. 
 
The Dialogical Conception of Interaction 
The notion of interaction may, however, be conceptualised quite differently, as shown, 
in particular, in the work by G.H. Mead and K. Lewin. A central concept developed by Mead 
is that of “conversation of symbolic gestures” which accounts for thinking processes and 
language. Whereas a “conversation of gestures” is a simple chain of stimulus and response, 
which can be found in animals or in elementary types of human interaction, conversation of 
symbolic gestures is, according to Mead, specific to the human mind. It consists of a triple or 
threefold relationship, which, in Mead’s terms, is composed of the gesture of the first 
organism, the adjustive response (namely the interpretation) of the second organism, and the 
resultant social act that the gesture initiates. Consequently, meaning is not a “psychical 
content (a content of mind or consciousness)” (Mead, 1967, p. 76); it originates neither in the 
speaker’s mind, nor in language as a code (la langue), but is dependent upon the way in 
which speaker A interprets speaker B’s gesture and (more importantly) expects B to interpret 
A’s gesture. This conception of meaning (see also Marková, 1990) is very close to 
conceptions that were developed later on, in particular in Conversation Analysis, with the 
notion of third turn repair (Schegloff, 1992).  
As regards Lewin, his originality was to consider that individual behaviour cannot be 
understood independently of the field or life space in which it occurs (Lewin, 1951b). Life 
 Interaction Analysis and Psychology 7 
space is a “quasi-stationary equilibrium” which results from a joint action between a certain 
physical and social environment, and a certain psychological state. Life space moves along 
with the physical and social environment. In other terms, the individual and the environment 
form an indivisible unit of analysis and are interdependent. Hence, for Lewin, issues such as 
attitude change and behavioural change (food habits, for example) could not be explained 
without taking into account the field in which the individual acts. 
The factorial vs. dialogical conceptions of interaction give way to a diverging 
definition of the unit of analysis which should be adopted to analyse human behaviour. 
According to a factorial conception, the unit of analysis is the individual conceived of as an 
entity which is subjected to various external influences. In such models, environmental factors 
are added to the core unit of analysis, the individual. Consequently, the notion of context is 
defined as a set of external variables that have certain objective characteristics. By contrast, 
according to a dialogical conception, the unit of analysis is the interaction as a whole, for 
example the individual and their social and physical environment. In this perspective, the 
physical environment (or the “context”) is not only external, it is constructed by the subject 
who actively interprets it. In Lewin’s work, the term “ecological psychology” refers to the 
fact that the context in which the subject acts is also an outcome of his or her own 
psychological activity. 
Starting from this dialogical conception of interaction, I shall now broaden the field 
and present some general characteristics of a dialogical approach to language and thinking. 
 
The Dialogical Approach in Psychology: Theoretical and Methodological Implications 
At first sight, the terms dialogue and dialogical refer to situations in which two or 
more persons talk together. However, in the sense adopted here, the term dialogue has a more 
extended meaning (Linell, 1998, 2009). For many linguists and psychologists (e.g., Wertsch, 
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1991), the terms dialogue and dialogical refer to Bakhtin (e.g. 1953/1986) who developed 
what he called metalingvistika (translated by the term metalinguistics in the American and 
English editions of Bakhtin’s work) which, according to Todorov (1981/1984), is a precursor 
of linguistic pragmatics. Broadly put, a dialogical approach takes the dialogue between the 
subject (I) and the Other (you) as a starting point for a theorisation of language and cognition. 
As Marková showed (2003; see also Marková 2006), dialogicality (according to her 
terminology) is both an ontological and an epistemological stance that has many philosophical 
roots (see also Linell, 1998, 2005, 2009). Observing social psychology from a dialogical 
stance, she claimed that social psychology is mostly based upon a presupposition of stability 
in both thinking and action, and lacks theories of social knowledge based upon the concept of 
change (see also Shotter & Billig, 1998). According to Marková, making distinctions or 
thinking in antinomies (for example right/left; good/evil; light/dark) are “such fundamental 
characteristics of the human mind” (p. 31) that they should be the point of departure of any 
theory of social knowledge that seeks to account for the heterogeneous and multifaceted 
nature of thinking. In a brief historical survey, she shows how, after Hegel, many scholars 
(Tarde, Jung, Freud, Wallon, etc.) have tried to integrate the idea that human mind is made of 
tensions, contractions, conflicts. As a basic antinomy, the Ego-Alter distinction leads to the 
idea that dialogicality is fundamental to human intelligence. By “dialogicality”, she means: 
the capacity of the human mind to conceive, create, and communicate about realities 
in terms of the “Alter” (Marková, 2003, p. 85) 
According to her, the mind is “the capacity of human beings to communicate, to make 
sense of signs, symbols and meanings in their experience, as well as to create new signs, 
symbols and meanings” (p. 23). Human thinking and action are conceived of as activities that 
are accomplished and constructed through language and social interactions. Individuals are 
perceived as being heterogeneous subjects who draw upon various resources to make sense of 
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their environment. Moreover, the Subject and the Others are thought of in terms of being 
complementary elements which are in dialogical tension. 
Defined in this broad way, the dialogical approach has resulted in disciplinary 
reconfigurations that have shifted the boundaries between disciplines in social sciences. It is 
thus not an exaggeration to say that a new disciplinary field is emerging, which takes human 
interaction as a research object (Grossen, 2008). In this new disciplinary field, interaction 
analysis is a basic tool which, as the studies reported through this article show, is used in 
order to understand how human beings make sense of their environment and of their 
emotional life, how they cooperate in everyday life and in various social organisations, in 
order to construct new bodies of knowledge, to work, etc. 
However, talking of a “dialogical approach” in the singular is possible as long as we 
give a general definition of dialogicality. As soon as we enter into the details of the many 
theories founded on these general assumptions, we can but state that speaking in the singular 
is misleading. In fact, on a historical level, be it on the side of philosophy or on that of 
psychology and other social sciences, the sources of dialogism are multiple (Marková, 2003; 
Linell, 2009). Depending on these sources, the way of exploiting the paradigm of dialogism 
may be quite different and give way to various theoretical strands. So, speaking of “a” 
dialogical approach does not hold if we consider the specific theories that emerge from these 
assumptions. The differences between these various theories are due to multiple factors: one 
reason lies in the specificity of the research object under study, which might lead the authors 
to give precedence to some authors. For example, the dialogical self theory (Hermans, 2001; 
Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Gonçalves & Salgado, 2001; Salgado & Gonçalves, 2007; 
Valsiner, 2005), which aims at developing a dynamic account for the organisation and 
functioning of the self, draws not only on Bakhtin but also on William James, who inspired  
the key-notion of “I-position”, as well as on George Herbert Mead with his theory of the self. 
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One of the specificities of this dialogical trend is to renew the field of therapeutic change by 
providing a theoretical framework that provides a dynamic view of the self.  
In social psychology, Michael Billig proposed a reinterpretation of classic themes of 
this field, in particular attitude change, by putting emphasis upon the argumentative nature of 
human thinking and by developing what he called discursive psychology (e.g., Billig, 1996), a 
trend which appeared to be fully in line with a Bakhtinian approach to language and human 
thinking (Shotter & Billig, 1998). With respect to the former trend, the specificity of 
discursive psychology is to put much emphasis on a close analysis of the dynamics of 
discourse in the analysis of their data. 
As another example of a theoretical strand pertaining to a dialogical approach, we may 
also mention socio-cultural psychology inspired in particular by Vygotsky. In this case, the 
research object is the development of thinking and learning (Mercer & Littleton, 2007; Muller 
Mirza & Perret-Clermont, 2009; Rojas-Drummond, Mazon, Fernandez & Wegerif, 2006; 
Wertsch, 1991), as well as thinking and learning in various situations (workplaces in 
particular). In this trend, Bakhtin proved to be an interesting complement to Vygotsky for his 
theory of discourse which opened the way to the study of discourses that are responsive to 
broader social contexts than the here-and-now context.  
Of course, these examples, that represent three major theoretical trends pertaining to a 
dialogical approach, do not cover the entire range  of theories that might be labelled 
“dialogical”, but they suffice to show that the dialogical approach is a vast and heterogeneous 
field which is criss-crossed by various debates and disagreements. This is also why, in what 
follows, I shall not be able to do justice to this variety and shall mainly draw upon one of 
these trends, pertaining to social psychology and socio-cultural psychology. My main 
theoretical background was inspired by scholars who, in the post-Piagetian and post-
Vygotskian trends, have worked on learning and development and have integrated the issue of 
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dialogue into their models (e.g. Perret-Clermont, 1980; Perret-Clermont, Perret & Bell, 1991; 
Mercer & Littleton, 2007). In this field, Ragnar Rommetveit (1992, 2003), who was deeply 
influenced by Bakhtin (among others), was the first to introduce a dialogical approach in 
developmental cognitive psychology. He did it by starting from radical criticisms against 
mainstream cognitivism and psycholinguistics (Josephs, 1998). My own background has been 
further influenced by the work of various colleagues from psychology or linguistics with 
whom I had the opportunity to work on therapeutic discourse and focus groups (Marková, 
Linell, Grossen & Salazar Orvig, 2007). 
Drawing on this background, I shall now discuss four central assumptions of a 
dialogical approach which refer to the co-construction of meaning, the multivoicedness, the 
context as a construction, and tools as a non-human agency. For each assumption, I shall first 
provide a brief theoretical introduction and then present some analytical tools that try to align 
on these dialogical assumptions. However, a close examination of these methodological tools 
will lead me to discuss their limitations and, eventually, to ask whether it is actually possible 
to develop analytical tools that are fully coherent with dialogical assumptions. 
 
The Co-construction of Meaning 
One key-element of a dialogical approach is that language is fundamentally polysemic 
and that its meaning is not predetermined by the linguistic code but constructed within a 
certain discursive situation. While this claim might seem self-evident for linguists working on 
discourse, this is certainly not usual in psychology1. More specifically, three dialogical core 
assumptions about language are, in my view, still not fully acknowledged in psychology. The 
first assumption regards precisely the fact that language is polysemic and that its meanings do 
not lie within the words but in their use in certain social situations. In this view (which 
reminds us of Mead), meanings are not inscribed within language; they are constructed 
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through discourse and derive from an interactive work. The second assumption, which is 
more specifically stressed by Bakhtin (1935/1981) and Voloshinov (1929/1986), is that any 
discourse is always addressed to an interlocutor (addressivity) and is therefore based upon an 
anticipation of the interlocutor’s comprehension (responsivity). As Rommetveit puts it in an 
interview given to Josephs (1998): 
What is asserted in any particular case of communication outside a Platonic universe 
of pure ideas (…) makes sense if and only if it entails an answer to some explicitly 
raised or tacitly taken for granted question (p. 196). 
In other words, the interlocutor’s possible response is contained within the speaker’s 
discourse, and any piece of discourse has one component made up of responsivity and another 
of addressivity (Bakhtin, 1935/1981). A third assumption is more familiar to psychologists, 
since it draws upon Vygotsky’s conception of language, and claims that language has not only 
a social function, but also a symbolic function (Vygotsky, 1934/1988). Language is conceived 
of as a semiotic tool that enables the development of higher psychological functions and 
accounts for the specificity of human intelligence. 
Put together, these three assumptions have drastic methodological consequences for 
the study of human cognition. They imply that usual research objects, for example human 
cognition and learning, have to focus upon joint activity as it is achieved within a certain 
context. The research object then becomes one of examining  through which processes the 
participants in an interaction make sense of the situation in which they are involved and how 
they reach some states of intersubjectivity which enable them to carry out a task or to reach 
their goals. The unit of analysis is not the isolated individual but the individual, and the other 
present participants as well as absent participants (or third parties) which might indirectly 
orientate the participants’ actions. Moreover, if, with Vygotsky (1934/1988), we assume that 
tools play a fundamental role (a semiotic function) in the development of thinking, then the 
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unit of analysis also includes the tools that the participants use to carry out an activity. There 
is thus a shift from the study of an isolated individual seen as a constructor of his or her 
environment to the study of joint processes of meaning construction. 
The process of co-construction of meaning has been studied in numerous situations, 
for example classroom interactions, peer interactions at school, workplaces, therapeutic 
discourse. In the latter field, the research object deals with the interactional processes through 
which the therapists and the patients make sense of the “problem” and transform it throughout 
their encounters (Buttny, 1996; Grossen & Salazar Orvig, 2006; Peräkylä, Antaki, 
Vehviläinen, & Leudar, 2008; Vehviläinen, 2003). The “problem” which is talked about 
during a therapeutic session is not conceived of as the client’s inner mental world, which is 
coded (or “translated”) into language, but as the result of an intersubjective process implying 
reciprocal attunement (or alignments). The “problem” is not simply put into words, its 
meaning is negotiated through interactional work, for a certain purpose in a particular social 
and institutional setting (Grossen & Apothéloz, 1996). It is thus fundamentally addressed to 
the Other and constructed through the Other. 
 
Methodological Implications 
This theoretical framework implies that on a methodological level, the analytical tools 
have to account for the interlocutory process. I will now refer to a study carried out by 
Grossen & Apothéloz (1996) in order to present one method that we have used to reach this 
goal, and to discuss the limits of this method. In this study as in many others (e.g., Antaki, 
Barnes, & Leudar, 2005), reformulation was used as an analytical tool in order to analyse how 
certain “problems” were thematised and transformed throughout a therapeutic session. At an 
operational level, reformulation was defined as a three-phase sequence: (1) a source (the 
reformulated discourse); (2) a reformulation marker, which introduces the reformulation and 
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may be either a metadiscursive clause such as you told me that, you mentioned that, etc. or a 
reformulation marker such as in other words, namely, well, thus, etc.; (3) the reformulation 
itself, which can be either a self-reformulation or an other-reformulation. The interactional 
construction of meaning was then analysed by comparing the source with the reformulation. 
Excerpt 1 is taken from a first session with two therapists (a woman [WT], and a man), a 
father (F), a mother (M) and their two children2. Just before this excerpt, F alluded twice to 
the existence of conflicts within the couple. He spoke of their children's unwillingness to obey 
and of his attempts to exert his authority. 
(1) 
1 WT: (to F) when you talk about misunderstanding in the sense 
2 of misplaced understanding I don't know but it seems to me that 
3 there was nevertheless a sort of complementarity 
4 F: that's to say understanding on my wife's part that [I felt like 
5  that] (…) 
Excerpt 1 contains two marked reformulations (in italics): another-reformulation 
introduced by a metadiscursive clause (line 1); a self-reformulation introduced by a marker 
(line 4). The sources of WT's reformulation are reported in Excerpts 2 and 3: 
(2) 
1 F: no I think that the thing which is very present the thing which is 
2 very evident in our couple is that their mother brings gentleness 
3 understanding even if it's how can I put it even if it's misplaced 
4 understanding if I can say that because he doesn't want to eat because 
5 he's not hungry but he'll eat after the meal or things like that er and me 
6 I bring authority as well as bringing a lot of affection but er when I 
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7 want things a certain way that's that even if I have to lose my temper) 
(3) 
1 F: exactly this is where I come back to to to this UNDERSTANDING 
2 which was sometimes misplaced it's that now they don't do as they’re 
3 told anymore or at least less a lot LESS and even things that with me I 
4 simply told them and they did it and that was it with the mother all 
5 that's finished 
The comparison between the source and the reformulation shows that WT takes up the 
expression misplaced understanding used by F in the excerpts 2 (lines 3-4) and 3 (lines 1-2) 
and summarises F's description of his role and that of his wife, using the expression 
complementarity. In so doing, WT introduces a divergence with respect to F’s discourse. 
Whereas F’s term misplaced suggests some negative evaluation, WT’s term complementarity 
frames the reported episode in a positive way, and represents implicitly a refusal to see M as 
the person responsible for the couple’s conflicts.  
This analytical tool (for details see Apothéloz & Grossen, 1995) enabled us to study 
the transformation of the “problem” from the first formulation to the end of the session and to 
analyse long pieces of dialogue. However, in the light of a dialogical approach, this method 
raises three main issues. Firstly, what importance should be paid to linguistic markers? In 
fact, considering that reformulations are indicated by linguistic markers (and only by them) 
amounts to attributing intentions to the speakers from the words they use. And this goes 
against the dialogical assumption that meaning is constructed through interlocution. In 
addition, not all reformulations are introduced by linguistic markers. However, broadening the 
methodological definition of reformulation to include non-marked reformulations (e.g., 
Grossen, 1996) may imply that every piece of discourse is a reformulation. Secondly, if we 
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admit with Bakhtin (1935/1981) that any discourse is always a sort of reformulation of other 
discourses, then another difficulty emerges: some reformulations may be difficult, or even 
impossible, to identify, for example when a speaker reformulates a piece of discourse that he 
or she heard or said in another situation. As a consequence, the distinction between 
formulation and reformulation is relevant only if we assume that a piece of discourse is a 
strictly individual production and that the process of reformulation takes place within the 
observed situation.  
A third and related issue concerns the distinction between self- and other-
reformulations. Again, if we assume that any discourse is always a response to previous (real 
or virtual) discourse (Goodwin, 2006), as well as an answer to an anticipated response, then 
the distinction between self- and other-reformulation is disputable. In fact, if a self-
reformulation is an anticipation of the addressee’s interpretation, then in a sense it is also 
nothing but… an other-reformulation. Moreover, the distinction between self- and other-
reformulations implies that the turn is the unit of analysis and, thus, an individual production, 
whereas Goodwin and Goodwin (1992) precisely showed that even a single turn is a 
collaborative production.  
So, despite the fact that reformulation deals with interlocution, it does not fully meet 
the dialogical assumptions that guided the choice of the method (for other methods aimed at 
grasping the dialogism of therapeutic interview, see Salazar Orvig & Grossen, 2008). One 
could of course simply conclude that the method was irrelevant. However, many methods 
based upon interlocution take the turn as a unit of analysis so that, in my view, the issue goes 
beyond this particular example and shows the difficulty of transforming a dialogical stance 
into analytical tools. Is it actually possible to develop a method that is fully dialogical? Let me 
further examine this question. 
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Multivoicedness and Heteroglossia 
In his essay “Discourse in the Novel” (Bakhtin, 1935/1981) developed the idea that 
any discourse is fundamentally dialogical, namely is orientated towards discourses which 
have already been spoken by other people, and is determined by a response which is not 
already uttered but requested and anticipated. According to Bakhtin, dialogism is an internal 
property of language, and discourse itself is characterised by “social heteroglossia” and 
multivoicedness. Any discourse contains the traces of previous discourses, is made of 
different genres (rhetoric, journalistic, literary, scientific, etc.), and echoes discourses (or 
voices) uttered by other people in different places at different times. According to Bakhtin, 
others voices are the background on which the prose artist (and, let us say, by extension the 
speaker’s voice) is placed and echoed. Thus, discourse is fundamentally heterogeneous or, in 
other words, stratified by different genres and voices. According to Bakhtin, professional 
jargons (the discourse of physicians, politicians, teachers, etc.) are one aspect of this 
stratification of discourse. They are not only defined by lexical aspects, but represent 
particular forms of interpretation of the world. So, as Bakhtin puts it, a professional jargon, as 
does any discourse, constitutes a specific point of view on the world: 
 (…) all languages of heteroglossia, whatever the principle underlying them and 
making each unique, are specific points of view on the world, forms for 
conceptualizing the world in words, specific world views each characterised by its 
own objects, meanings and values (Bakthin, 1935/1981, p. 291-292) 
Over the last years, the study of “professional” or “institutional” discourse has gained 
more and more importance in social sciences (e.g., Candlin, 2002; Drew & Sorjonen, 1997; 
Gunnarsson, Linell, & Nordberg, 1997; Linell & Sarangi, 1998; Sarangi & Roberts, 1999; 
Mäkitalo, 2006). Studying the field of psychotherapy, social, and medical work, many 
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scholars showed that the practitioners’ discourse draws upon shared and tacit assumptions 
which have been developed in certain communities of practice and which guide the 
professionals’ interpretations and actions (e.g., Drew & Heritage, 1992). They also showed 
that the practitioners’ discourse is composed of various discourses which have been 
developed over time by different institutions, for example medicine, law, psychiatry, 
education, etc., as illustrated by the use of jargon, of certain communicative genres and of 
certain routines.  
This research strand is interesting not only because it accounts for actual professional 
practices, but also because it challenges the very notion of face-to-face interaction by showing 
that a “simple” relationship between two persons is in reality populated by many other social 
actors. Moreover, it shows that answering the question “who speaks?” is more complex than it 
seems and leads to further questions such as: what voices are included in the speaker’s 
discourse (Marková, Linell, Grossen, & Salazar Orvig, 2007)? From which discursive 
position does the speaker speak? What social identity does he or she put to the fore when he 
or she speaks? All these questions are challenging for the field of psychology because they 
question two classic dichotomies: the self-other dichotomy and the language-cognition 
dichotomy (Linell, 2005, 2009; Marková, 2003). In other words, by using language, 
individuals construct themselves as subjects through the words of others. On a psychological 
level, it means that subjectivity is an emerging property of intersubjectivity and that 
individuals themselves are heterogeneous, namely made out of and through different Others. 
This view is congruent with the theory of dialogical self and its notion of I-positioning 
(Coelho & Figueiredo, 2003; Hermans, 2002; Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007; Salgado & 
Ferreira, 2004; Valsiner, 2002; Zittoun, 2006). 
 
Methodological Implications 
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On a methodological level, this theoretical framework requires the development of 
analytical tools that can account for the heterogeneity of discourse in terms of heteroglossia 
and multivoicedness. It is what Salazar Orvig and myself (Salazar Orvig & Grossen, 2004) 
aimed at doing in our analysis of discussions collected in focus groups (see also Marková, 
Linell, Grossen, & Salazar Orvig, 2007). In these groups, the subjects had to discuss a 
dilemma dealing with medical confidentiality and to decide whether medical confidentiality 
should be broken or not. Apart from being analysed through interpersonal dialogue, 
heteroglossia and multivoicedness were grasped through clues which referred to what Salazar 
Orvig (2005) called the facets of dialogism, namely: (a) the instability of the subjects’ 
answers in apparently similar types of dilemma, (b) dialogue with distant discourses (when 
for example a subject refers to regulations concerning medical confidentiality), (c) the 
dialogue with oneself (for example when the subject develops two contrasting lines of 
arguments), (d) reported and virtual speech, (e) heteroglossia stricto sensu (for example when 
a subject uses a communicative genre which pertains to law or psychology), (f) the speaker’s 
identification with the characters depicted in the dilemma; this was analysed through the shift 
of personal pronouns (I, we, you) in the speaker’s discourse, (g) the speaker’s discursive 
positions (does the speaker mention that he or she speaks from a certain standpoint: that of a 
student, a man, a lawyer, etc?). 
A similar point of view can be adopted for the analysis of face-to-face research 
interviews. This is what we are currently doing in a study in which school psychologists were 
questioned about their professional practice with psychological tests (Grossen, Florez, & 
Lauvergeon, 2006). Using partly the same clues as those described by Salazar Orvig, we 
identified the various voices that populate the interviewee’s discourse, for example: the voice 
of the writers of the test manual; the voice of the organisation in which the psychologists 
work; the institutional voice of the test designers and of differential psychology; the clients’ 
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voice, etc. This is illustrated in Excerpt 4 in which one psychologist is talking about 
projective tests and tests in general, and in Excerpt 5 in which another psychologist talks 
about an intelligence test, the WISC3: 
(4) 
1 well you cannot just read the score sheet and say “so and so” because 
2 the parents are not dupe “what is he saying this psychologist” 
(5) 
1 for example in the mathematical subtest of the WISC, the fact that the 
2 answer is either correct or wrong is almost anecdotic with respect to- 
3 when it is correct err + did he understand or is it, let’s say, a 
4 thoughtless application, or when it’s wrong is it a computation 
5 mistake, is it a reasoning mistake, is it a mistake due to a 
6 misunderstanding of the instruction, there are completely different 
7 things and the result you code it always wrong (…) so I distrust a lot a 
8 standard interpretation 
The psychologists’ discourse refers to at least two different voices: the voices of the 
parents of the tested child (Excerpt 4, line 2) and the test designers’ voice (Excerpt 5). 
However, whereas in Excerpt 4, the use of direct reported speech provides a rather 
unambiguous clue indicating the reference to other voices, in Excerpt 5 things are less clear. It 
is mostly the use of verbal (semantic) categories such as correct or wrong associated with 
answer (lines 2 and 3), or the expression standard interpretation (line 8), and the reference to 
coding procedures, which allow us to infer the presence of the designers’ voices. Still other 
voices can be identified in this excerpt. For example, the French expression application bête 
et méchante (literally silly and bad application, translated here by thoughtless in line 4) is a 
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typical expression that mathematics teachers sometimes use to refer to the action of a student 
who made a mistake by applying a mathematical formula without reasoning. Consequently, 
we could, in addition, claim that this excerpt also include voices from the school. 
This example illustrates that, in line with dialogical assumptions, even one single word 
is dialogical and crossed by previous discursive practices. However, put this way, the notion 
of dialogism applies to every discourse and looses any empirical efficiency. On an empirical 
level, this statement even leads to a sort of contradiction, since it means that if we want to 
analyse our data from a dialogical stance, we have to assume that some pieces of discourse 
are “more” dialogical than others or are even monological. An answer to this apparent 
contradiction can be found in Morson & Emerson (1990) who stress that Bakhtin himself used 
the word dialogue in different senses (see also Salazar Orvig, 2005; Linell, 2009). One of 
them is general and claims that any utterance is by definition dialogical. In a second sense, 
however, Bakhtin admitted that some utterances may be more monological than others. This 
is, for example, the case in his comparison between poetic discourse and the discourse of the 
novel (Bakhtin, 1935/1981).  
Drawing on the different senses of the term dialogue identified by Morson & Emerson 
(1990), Linell (2009) proposes to make a difference between the monological vs. dialogical 
organisation of a discourse, and its monoperspectivity vs. multiperspectivity. Whereas the 
first dimension refers to the organisation of a discourse, the second refers to the fact that a 
piece of discourse (a text) might only present one point of view on its topic. As an example, 
Linell cites legal, scientific, religious or propaganda texts. All these texts belong to what he 
calls “monologized texts”, texts that tend to defend one unique viewpoint. They are situated in 
certain social practices but, at the same time, they are also decontextualised in the sense that 
they try to extend the generalisation of their discourse. Linell emphasises that scientific 
discourse is both locally monological and “part of a longer traditions of dialogical sense-
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making” (p. 374). At a local level, it has to defend a certain position with coherence and 
consistency,  in a wider context, it is part of a debate that includes various competing 
positions and has to situate itself with respect to these various positions4. From this viewpoint, 
we can reconsider Excerpts 4 and 5, and state that it is of course impossible from a 
researcher’s standpoint to capture all the possible voices that are included in a certain piece of 
discourse. This is due to the fact that scientific practices are locally monologising and also to 
the fact that language itself is “living discourse” (Bakhtin, 1935/1981) and is made up of the 
history of its multiple usages. On a methodological level, it is thus impossible to grasp the 
traces of the dialogism of words (or, put differently, of heteroglossia). 
Hence, the analysis of the subject’s discourse, as well as a scientific report that might 
be written, necessarily lead to a reduction of the multivoicedness of the subjects’ discourse, 
and nolens volens give more emphasis to the analysts’ voice. A second (and related) reason is 
that if we admit with Rommetveit (Josephs, 1998) that methods are communicative genres 
(that is to say dialogues which make sense for the subjects and the researchers within a 
particular context and in a particular activity), then using this genre is also a way of relating to 
certain objects, persons and communities of practices. To put it differently, scientific 
discourse and practices as a “canonised” genre also reflect a certain interpretation of the world 
and, in this sense, reduce the multivoicedness and heteroglossia of discourse. 
These issues show that language is more than a means of communicating our results, it 
is a tool through which our results (and by extension our disciplines) are constructed.  
 
The Context as a Construction 
As was shown earlier on, a factorial conception of interaction views the context as a 
variable that influences the subject. This conception implies that in certain conditions the 
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“effect” of the context can be neutralised and the context becomes transparent, as if the 
influence of the context could equal zero. 
This conception was put in jeopardy as early as the twenties by the sociologists of the 
School of Chicago who showed that the subjects interpret the situation in which they act and 
have thus their “definition of the situation” (Thomas & Znaniecki, 1981). Since then, the idea 
that the context is a dynamic product of the subjects’ activity has been taken up by many 
authors and has led them to define the context as a potential interactional resource which is 
not simply given but is accomplished within and through interactions (e.g., McHoul, Rapley, 
& Antaki, 2008). Consequently, the context is not a container in which the subjects act, but a 
dynamic and ever changing process (Goodwin & Duranti, 2002).  
This view, which fits a dialogical conception of interaction, considerably challenges 
certain classic objects of study in psychology. In developmental psychology, it has been an 
incentive to study thinking as an intersubjective process and a context-bound activity. Special 
emphasis has been put upon the enmeshment between the subject’s definition of the situation 
and cognitive activity (e.g., Wertsch, Minick, & Arns, 1984). Research carried out by 
Rommetveit (1976) showed that the child’s answers in a test are tightly linked with the states 
of intersubjectivity which the adult and the child construct through the interactional dynamics 
(see also Elbers & Kelderman, 1994; Grossen, 2000; Säljö, 1991). It was also shown that in a 
test situation, the experimenter is not neutral (Grossen & Perret-Clermont, 1994) and that 
scaffolding strategies (Bruner, 1990) such as mutual co-orientation, (mis)alignments and 
feedbacks, may also be observed in these situations. In other words, the child’s cognitive 
activity cannot be disentangled from the way in which the adult and the child construct the 
context and make sense of the situation and of the task. 
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Methodological Implications 
Beyond a general agreement that a context is not a set of external variables, there is a 
debate between two competing views: (a) the first is that interaction analysis should be 
restricted to resources that the participants themselves use within their interactions in order to 
construct and transform the context, (b) the second claims that interaction analysis should 
include ethnographic data concerning the situation in which the subjects interact, for example, 
the organisational dimension of the work in a hospital. 
This debate illustrates that interaction analysis may rely upon two different positions 
with respect to the choice of a unit of analysis: according to the first position (e.g., Schegloff, 
1992), the object under study is the conversational machinery (or the dynamics of 
interactions) as a self-contained activity. The analysis aims at showing how the participants 
construct the context through the use of different interactional resources. The analysts’ 
explicit intention is to adopt the participants’ perspective and to avoid attributing mental 
states to their subjects. To some extent, and as I understand it, the ambition is to avoid 
introducing the analysts’ voice into an interpretation of the data. In a similar vein, it is also 
claimed that the use of ethnographic data leads the analysts to draw unverifiable inferences, to 
over-interpret the material and to unconsciously impose their own perspective (or voices) on 
the data. 
According to the second position (e.g., Cicourel, 1992; Gumperz, 1982), the object of 
study concerns the subjects’ activity and discourse as context-bound activities. Researchers 
assume that the subjects draw upon resources that are not necessarily to be found or displayed 
within the micro-context of their interactions. For them, the subjects are historically situated 
social actors who develop various capacities and bodies of knowledge. Therefore, they claim 
that it is necessary to draw upon ethnographic data and that it is impossible to avoid 
introducing the analysts’ voice into an analysis of the data. For them, sticking to ongoing 
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interactional processes leads to isolating the immediate situation from other situations and 
eventually amounts to adopting two principles that pertain to experimental designs, namely 
observing the subjects in a “controlled” laboratory situation and neutralising as much as 
possible the “experimenter’s effect”. Moreover, avoiding the attribution of mental states to the 
subjects amounts to disregarding the fact that analysts cannot escape what seems to be a 
fundamental characteristic of human beings, namely mutuality and reciprocity (Marková, 
Graumann, & Foppa, 1995).  
To sum up, the debate hinges on whether interaction analysis should be limited to 
immediate interactions, or should on the contrary include longer (and not always observed) 
sequences. In my view, the interest of this debate is that it shows a tension between theoretical 
and methodological requirements. On a theoretical level, taking the multivoicedness and 
heterogeneity of an interaction fully into account implies that the subjects we observe in a 
certain situation are social actors who have experienced many other situations. Thus the 
subjects interpret the situation in which they are involved in the light of their experience in 
other situations. They talk in a certain situation with direct and indirect reference to earlier 
discourses. This point of view implies that the unit of analysis should include observations 
which go beyond immediate interactions. However, on a methodological level, researchers are 
expected to be rigorous and accountable in the use of their tools. Invoking other situations in 
order to make sense of what the subjects do in the situation in which they are observed may 
be more tentative, interpretive and open to discussion. As Schegloff (1992) argues, it also 
may include some implicit causality that is disputable and is mostly based upon the 
researchers’ assumptions. In my view, this debate shows that being fully dialogical and 
sticking to standard methodological rules are partly incompatible. In fact, if we want to be 
accountable for our research practices and offer them for discussion, certain compromises are 
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necessary which, as I showed earlier, present the risk of “monologising” the analysis of the 
data and their report. 
 
Tools as a Non-Human Agency 
In developmental psychology, it is a usual practice to place the subjects in so-called 
“individual” situations in which they are required (by an Other, namely the experimenter) to 
carry out a task (on this topic see Rommetveit, 2003). In this context, the unit of analysis is 
clearly the subject’s verbal and non-verbal actions, and when the word “interaction” is used at 
all, it mostly refers to the actions that a subject carries out in order to solve a problem or 
answer a question, that is, to the subject-task interactions. The task itself is generally 
considered to be a method for revealing the subjects’ mental states or abilities (as a 
photosensitised paper reveals its subject). 
Now, when linguists study conversation (or verbal interactions), they may observe 
their subjects in natural settings (everyday conversation, psychotherapy talk, etc.) or ask them 
to talk about a determined topic in more formal settings. In this type of situation, there is often 
no task to carry out and the analysis of the data is mostly focused upon verbal interactions. 
The problem becomes more complex when the subjects have to carry out a task, or are 
observed in complex settings (e.g., Engeström & Middleton, 1996), such as workplaces, 
where tools and physical objects are an integral part of their activity. Workplace studies 
carried out in cockpits (Hutchins & Klausen, 1996), undergrounds (Joseph, 1994), hospitals 
(Grosjean & Lacoste, 1999) and other firms (Trognon & Grusenmeyer, 1997; Wenger, 1998), 
raise challenging issues for psychologists, since they question the assumption that human 
cognition (or “intelligence”) is an internal and individual property, and show that human 
cognition results from the interaction between a subject, Others, and physical objects and 
tools. This is an aspect which has been emphasized by Latour (1996) who introduced the 
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notion of interobjectivity in order to challenge that of intersubjectivity. According to him, 
widely shared definitions of interaction (e.g., a situation of co-presence which brings about 
the emergence of unforeseen behaviour, novelty) ignore the fact that human interactions are 
mediated by objects which keep their interactions within certain frames. This means that 
objects have their own agency5 and contribute to the creation of certain forms of interpersonal 
interactions. Workplace studies have now provided a body of data showing the mediating 
roles of tools and physical objects (e.g., Heath & Luff, 2000). 
 
Methodological Implications 
Workplace studies, and more generally studies which focus upon the role of physical 
objects and artefacts, are a source of inspiration for the study of situations which are 
apparently very different from the complex work environment which has been observed in 
this field. They raise interesting questions about, for example, the role of objects in emotions. 
Let me briefly illustrate this point with a study on therapeutic processes at work in a brief 
cognitive-behavioural group therapy for women with eating disorders. Cavaleri Pendino 
(2008) analysed the interactions between the participants, and the role of a “Self-Monitoring-
Form” (SMF) in which the participants had to write down all the aliments they ate in a day 
and the emotions related to this eating. The analysis of the data associated the participants’ 
discourse with the actions carried out on the SMF (taking it, opening it, leafing it through, 
etc.) throughout the thirteen sessions of the therapy. The results showed that at the beginning 
of the therapy, the SMF gave the participants an opportunity to talk about themselves by 
focusing upon alimentation and food. However, later in the therapy, the use of the SFM was 
abandoned and the participants began to produce self-narratives which were not directly 
linked with eating. In other words, the SFM worked as a sort of release mechanism (or 
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mediator) that enabled the participants to move out of the field of eating and being over-
weight, and to talk about their emotional life. 
This example shows that physical objects are not merely incidental to the participants’ 
verbal interactions. Physical objects and tools constitute non-human partners which contribute 
to the organisation of the activity and to the construction of the interaction (Grossen, Liengme 
Bessire, & Perret-Clermont, 1997). Moreover (and to put it plainly), this line of research 
challenges the very idea that emotions and cognitions are “inside” whereas physical objects 
and Others are “outside” the subject. 
However, apprehending the Subject, Others and physical object interactions as a 
whole (a dynamic field) raises an important issue: do all the constituents of this totality play a 
similar role? Speaking of complementarity between these three constituents is not to imply a 
fusion. This should be remembered if we do not want to reduce the issue of subjectivity to one 
of intersubjectivity (Valsiner, 1998). In this view, such questions as: do the subjects learn a 
new competence? Do they construct new meanings for their own life history or emotions? Do 
they change their behaviour? How do they change their environment? remain relevant 
questions that prevent us from falling into the possible trap of seeing the subject as a product 
of the environment, and stepping back into a deterministic vision of the relationship between 
the subject and the environment. The real challenge, however, is to answer these questions 
without stepping back to a monological stance and without getting rid of the notion of the 
subject. What is needed then is a better understanding of the way in which intersubjectivity 
and, let us say, “interobjectivity” contribute to the construction of certain forms of 
subjectivity which are fundamentally intersubjective.  
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Conclusion 
Starting from a reflection on the conception of interaction in the field of psychology, 
this article was aimed at discussing some methodological issues that emerge when researchers 
try to put dialogical assumptions into research practices. 
My discussion was organised around four assumptions underlying a dialogical 
approach (the co-construction of meaning, multivoicedness and heteroglossia, the context as a 
construction, and tools as non-human agency). After a brief description of each assumption, I 
examined the methodological implications of this dialogical stance and discussed some 
methodological difficulties or challenges. In so doing, my aim was to test the limitations of 
these analytical tools and to see whether they are actually fully consistent with their dialogical 
assumptions. Let me now focus upon the four methodological implications which were 
discussed in this article. 
A first methodological implication is to assume that the dialogicality of the human 
mind implies working on interaction conceived of as interlocution, and not as the sum of 
individual actions. Consequently, our methodological tools have to account for the way in 
which discourse circulates from one speaker to another, and to show how a speaker is liable to 
take up another’s discourse and to integrate it into his or her own discourse as if it were his or 
her own. As I showed with the example of reformulation, this is not an easy task, since in 
order to analyse a dialogue, researchers have necessarily to isolate a piece of discourse from a 
chain of discourse, with the risk of monologising discourse. In this particular example, it 
means that since any formulation is to some extent always the reformulation of another 
discourse, talking about “reformulation” derives partially from the method itself. 
A second methodological implication is that studying verbal interaction in a dialogical 
approach requires being able to account not only for interlocution but for multivoicedness and 
heteroglossia, that is for the dialogical nature of discourse. As I showed, an important 
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difficulty in this respect is to determine what is a voice and what heteroglossia exactly entails. 
At a very general level in fact, language is made by and through heteroglossia, and identifying 
voices, for example, is impossible (Morson & Emerson, 1990). A challenge is then to define a 
grain of analysis that enables us on the one hand to exploit the notion of multivoicedness and 
heteroglossia in order to account for the dialogicality of discourse, but, on the other hand to 
do it in a way that does not, paradoxically, induce the idea that there might be a discourse 
without any trace of heteroglossia or multivoicedness. 
A third implication derives from the idea that a context is not only a set of external 
variables which influence individual actions or interindividual interactions. In this regard, I 
showed that there is a tension between, on the one hand, situating a certain interaction within 
its social environment, institutional setting, etc. (that is accounting for the connectedness 
between the present situation and other situations), and on the other hand setting oneself a 
certain rigour in the analysis of the data, by avoiding making inferences that go far beyond 
what could be understood from the data. Here again, whereas accounting for the way in which 
situations relate to each others seems to be in line with a dialogical approach, the rigour 
imposed by methodology might induce a certain monologisation of the data, that is, in this 
case, a certain decontextualisation of the data. 
A fourth methodological implication stems from the fact that human interactions are 
always mediated by semiotic tools as well as by tools and artefacts. The latter might only 
constrain or frame interindividual interactions (such as, for example, a table in a face-to-face 
interview), but they might also be part of the interaction itself (for instance, the self-
monitoring form in the group therapy which was presented). So, a challenge is to develop 
methodological tools that are able to show the intertwinement between discourse and 
artefacts, and to account for multimodal interactions. Here, the difficulty lies in the fact that 
considering human and non-human agency as a totality, a system does not, or should not, 
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imply that all elements of this totality are equal. A further challenge is thus to account for the 
differences between these various sorts of agencies. 
In conclusion, a close examination of these methodological implications together with 
their difficulties and challenges shows that the passage from theory to research practice 
entails a transformation process, which leads us to decontextualise the data and, thus, to 
monologise them. My argument was that, even in a dialogical perspective, researchers 
experience a tension between trying to account for the complexity of a situation and 
monologising the object of their observations by following certain methodological rules. In 
my view, however, this tension cannot be avoided and is representative of another 
fundamental tension in research into human activity: that of accounting both for the stability 
of certain phenomena and for their ongoing change. 
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Footnotes 
1There are of course numerous exceptions (for example Marková, Graumann, & 
Foppa, 1995; Rommetveit, 1992; the trend of cultural psychology (e.g., Bruner, 1990, 1996); 
Wertsch, 1991); the trend of discursive psychology (e.g., Billig, 1996). 
2The original language of all excerpts is French. In the transcripts […] indicates an 
overlap, words in capitals indicate that the speaker stresses a word and + means a brief pause. 
3Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children. 
4 In this respect, the paradox, as Linell (2009) emphasises, is that dialogism, or any 
other theory, is also a monologising practice. 
5Let us note, however, that the role of object (“physical thing”) was already a special 
concern for Mead (1932). 
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